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COMMENTARY
Strict Tort Liability: Has "Abnormal
Danger" Become a Fact?
OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR.*
Slowly in some areas, more quickly in others, tort law is moving
away from the concept of fault as a requisite of liability. Replacing
fault is a theory of enterprise liability: losses caused by an enterprise or
activity should be borne by that enterprise or activity.' It has been sug-
gested that liability without fault should be applied whenever (1) a par-
ticular endeavor takes a more or less inevitable accident toll, and (2)
many of the accident victims are ill-equipped economically to bear
their losses.2 It has also been noted that a system of "strict liability"
(i.e., liability without fault) has an advantage of ease in administra-
tion.'
Historically, tort law has employed strict liability in situations
where harm is produced by highly dangerous activities. In addition to
the above-stated general grounds for imposing liability without fault,
such liability has been considered particularly appropriate in this in-
stance because (1) it is fairer to impose losses on the perpetrator of a
highly dangerous enterprise than on the innocent victim, 4 and (2) ab-
normally dangerous activities frequently destroy, by their very opera-
tion, all evidence of the manner in which they were conducted (as in
the situation where explosives are intentionally detonated), thus mak-
ing difficult any determination of fault.' Furthermore, strict liability
*Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law-Ed.
I Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 153 (1976).
2 See James, General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negligence?,
24 TErNN. L. REv. 923 (1957). See also Comment, Liability Without Fault: Logic and Potential
of a Developing Concept, 1970 vis. L. REv. 1201, analyzing the trend over the past seventy
years toward strict criminal liability, without regard to the actor's state of mind.
See Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEG. STUDIES 151, 177-89 (1973).
See Chavez v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 413 F. Supp. 1203 (E.D. Cal. 1976) (said to
be consistent with strict liability in products cases); General Tel. Co. v. Bi-Co Pavers, Inc., 514
S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (one whose activities are accompanied by an extraordinary
risk, such as user of explosives, keeper of dangerous animals, or manufacturer of products that
are dangerous if defective, has better opportunity to avoid loss than does a potential victim). Cf.
Galbreath v. Engineering Constr. Corp., 149 Ind. App. 347, 273 N.E.2d 121 (1971) (in products
liability, no distinction made between direct and indirect effects; no such distinction should be
made in ultrahazardous activity strict liability either).
See Siegler v. Kuhlman, 81 Wash. 2d 448, 502 P.2d 1181 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
983 (1973); Peck, Negligence and Liability Without Fault in Tort Law, 46 WASH. L. REV. 225,
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1981
COMMENTAR Y
allows the loss from the dangerous activity to be spread, ultimately,
among the general public, who are presumably also the recipients of
the activity's benefits.
6
In recent years, much of the expansion of the theory of strict
liability in tort has been in such areas as products liability and/or
through such devices as insurance plans, rather than through any
growth in the older concept of liability without fault for dangerous ac-
tivities. But the growth of this last-mentioned area has now received
impetus from the adoption of a new Restatement (Second) definition
of "abnormally dangerous activity, "7 designed to increase the scope of
strict liability;8 to emphasize the requisite, for such liability, of non-
natural or unusual activity; 9 and to add weight, in assessments of an
activity's degree of peril, to the factor of the location in which the ac-
tivity is performed. 0
It has been stated in the past that the determination of what ac-
tivities are "abnormally dangerous" is a question of law for the
court. " This is declared to be the continuing rule in the Comments to
240 (1971). See generally Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REv. 537
(1972).
6 See Chavez v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 413 F. Supp. 1203 (E.D. Cal. 1976) (strict
liability imposed partly because activity somewhat antisocial, and partly in order to distribute the
loss among the public); Comment, Common Carriers and Risk Distribution: Absolute Liability
for Transporting Hazardous Materials, 67 KY. L.J. 441 (1978-79). See generally Calabresi, Some
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Feezer, Capacity
to Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decision of Certain Types of Tort Cases, 78 U. PA. L. REv. 805
(1930).
, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
Section 519 imposes strict liability on abnormally dangerous activities, and section 520 then lists
the six factors to be considered in determining abnormal danger: the existence of a high degree
of risk to the person or property of others; the likelihood that any resulting harm will be great;
the inability to eliminate the risk even by the exercise of reasonable care; the extent to which the
activity is not a matter of common usage; the inappropriateness of the activity to the place where
it is performed; and the extent to which the activity's value to the community is outweighed by
its dangerous characteristics. See Wade, Second Restatement of Torts Completed, 65 A.B.A.J.
366 (1979). On the difference between "strict liability" as applied to dangerous activities and as
applied to defective products, see Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182
N.W.2d 800 (1970).
1 See Annot., Applicability of Rule of Strict Liability to Injury from Electrical Current
Escaping from Powerline, 82 A.L.R.3d 218 (1978), noting increased likelihood that transmission
of electricity will now be subject to strict liability. Cf. Yommer v. McKenzie, 255 Md. 220, 257
A.2d 138 (1969), saying the new Restatement definition provides more guidance than did the
first Restatement on the question of strict liability, and holding strict liability applicable to a gas
station near a residence.
I RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 520, Comment i on Clause (d) (1977). See W. PROSSER,
SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW OF TORTS 146 (1954).
10 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, Comment j on Clause (e).
" Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 774, 56 Cal. Rptr. 128 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1967); Stroda v. State Highway Comm'n, 22 Or. App. 403, 539 P.2d 1147 (1975). See
Reter v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 258 Or. 140, 482 P.2d 170 (1971).
1981]
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the new Restatement.II But it has also been noted that the Restatement
definition of "abnormally dangerous" points away from any notion
of rigid categories of activities that are always highly dangerous and
activities that are never highly dangerous. 3 Indeed, the whole process
of deciding, under the new Restatement, what is extremely dangerous
and what is not becomes one of weighing and balancing a considerable
number of facts.' 4 It is therefore submitted that the Restatement itself,
and the precedents on which it relies, have transformed determinations
of what is "abnormally dangerous" into questions of fact.'I The pro-
cess of determining strict liability for highly dangerous endeavors in-
volves balancing not only in the initial determination of degree of
danger but in the subsequent determination of scope of liability: the
strict liability does not extend to harm "that would not have resulted
but for the abnormally sensitive character of the plaintiff's activity."' 6
Thus, there is clearly a need for establishing and applying community
norms as to what is a usual, and an unusual, degree of danger and of
sensitivity.
Though the Restatement (Second) lists, as above noted, a number
of factors that are to be weighed in deciding what is "abnormally
dangerous," cases have tended to give most weight to three elements:
the activity is inappropriate to the locale where performed; the activ-
ity involves a degree of danger that cannot be eliminated even by the
utmost care; and the activity is of an unusual nature. The first of these
factors is particularly stressed by the new Restatement, while the latter
two were the main points of emphasis under the prior Restatement. In
any case, it is submitted that all three elements of "abnormally
dangerous" involve questions of fact.
12 RESTATEMENT § 520, supra note 7, Comment 1, at 42.
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Tentative Draft No. 10, § 520, Note to the In-
stitute, at 59 (1964). Cf. Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 88 Wash. 2d 855, 567 P.2d 218 (1977)
(essential question is whether risk created is so unusual, either because of its magnitude or
because of factors surrounding it, as to justify liability despite exercise of reasonable care; crop-
spraying ruled to be abnormally dangerous). See generally Note, Regulation and Liability in the
Application of Pesticides, 49 IowA L. REv. 135 (1964). See also Faust, Strict Liability in Land-
owner Cases, 42 OR. L. REv. 273, 288-89 (1963) (classification should depend on a number of
issues, not merely the degree of risk involved).
" See RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 520 and Comment f.
I See Comment, Torts-Strict Liability for Hazardous Use of One's Land, 4 FLA. ST.
L. RE V. 304, 310-12 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment], suggesting that the distinction be-
tween "natural" and "non-natural" uses of property may best be drawn by the trier of fact, and
that all the Restatement factors may at some point become factual issues.
" RE. ATMENT, supra note 7, § 524A, at 51. See id. Comment a; RESTATEMENT § 519
and Comment e on subsection (2) (strict liability applies only to harm that is within the scope of the
abnormal risk that is the basis of the liability). It is not necessary to strict liability under the
Restatement that defendant be conducting his activity for profit. RESTATEMENT § 520, Comment
d. Nor that defendant be conducting the activity on his own property. Id. Comment e.
[Vol. 34:76
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The location of an allegedly ultrahazardous activity is considered
of great importance because strict liability is believed to be justified
where an additional risk is created for persons in a particular area by
some extraordinary or exceptional activity carried on therein. Thus, a
gasoline station may be declared not abnormally dangerous because
there are other such stations in the same area.' Water mains do not
give rise to strict liability even when they burst if they are of a kind
commonly used and if they are appropriately placed.' 8 Even blasting
has been said to create the possibility of strict liability only when con-
ducted in a populated, as opposed to an isolated, area.' 9
It has been stated that the determination of what is abnormally
dangerous cannot be made in the abstract: the spraying of a particular
chemical becomes highly dangerous, for instance, only if it presents a
serious risk to surrounding forms of life.2 0 But, if we are not to
create-in the abstract-categories of "abnormally dangerous
activity," and are instead to look at the physical surroundings, then
we are clearly looking to, and weighing the importance of, various
facts.
Much reliance has also been placed on the inevitability of risk in
"abnormally dangerous activities"-that is, the inability to eliminate,
even by the exercise of reasonable care, a substantial element of
danger. Thus, it has been held that, without regard to other factors, a
failure to remove dirt-fill is not abnormally dangerous because risks of
slippage, etc., can be controlled by reasonable caution.2' On the other
hand, the impounding of phosphate slimes has been ruled ultrahazard-
ous-despite an appropriate location and despite the value of the
, Hudson v. Peavey Oil Co., 279 Or. 3, 566 P.2d 175 (1977).
' Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co. v. Port of Seattle, 80 Wash. 2d 59, 491 P.2d 1037
(1971).
" See Robison v. Robison, 16 Utah 2d 2, 394 P.2d 876 (1964). Cf. Southwick v. Mullen,
Inc., 19 Utah 2d 430, 432 P.2d 56 (1967) (strict liability can apply if foreseeability of danger is
great; negligence should apply if likelihood of harm is remote). See generally Comment, Return
to Anonymous: The Dying Concept of Fault, 25 EMORY L.J. 163 (1976).
20 Bella v. Aurora Air, Inc., 279 Or. 13, 566 P.2d 489 (1977) (aerial spraying found
"ultrahazardous" and "abnormally dangerous"-court seems to use terms synonymously). Cf.
Loe v. Lenhardt, 227 Or. 242, 362 P.2d 312 (1961) (liability based on unintentional trespass
caused by abnormally dangerous activity). See generally Kennedy, Liability in the Aerial Ap-
plication of Pesticides, 22 S.D.L. REv. 75 (1977).
11 Nicolal v. Day, 264 Or. 354, 506 P.2d 483 (1973), applying the factors listed in
RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 520, Tentative Draft No. 10 (Apr. 20, 1964). Cf. McLoone Metal
Graphics, Inc., v. Robers Dredge, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 704, 207 N.W.2d 616 (1973) (landfilling
operation not so risky as to impose strict liability). See also Sun Pipe Line Co. v. Kirkpatrick,
514 S.W.2d 789 (rex. Civ. App. 1974) (spraying a defoliant along easement not inherently
dangerous so as to impose liability on defendant for acts of independent contractor, but plaintiff
was also held to have waived this theory).
19811
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enterprise to the community-largely on the basis that the risk cannot
be eliminated by care.2 2 Pile-driving would seem similarly danger-
ous-unless performed in extremely remote regions-so that liability
must attach despite the exercise of the utmost care. 3 But questions
regarding inability to eliminate risk are clearly ones of factual possi-
bilities versus impossibilities.
The final factor that has received emphasis in determining if an
activity is "abnormally dangerous" is the unusual nature of the activ-
ity. If a practice is usual and normal in present-day society, it is hard
to justify classifying it as abnormally risky because by definition it is
part of everyday life. Thus, the transmission of electricity has been
held a routine practice and therefore not ultrahazardous2 4 The same
may be true nowadays of the storage of natural gas in pipes or
mains. 5 But as with the factor of appropriateness, "common usage"
cannot be determined in a vacuum; what is "common" in one locality
may be quite extraordinary in another. Thus, the storage of large
quantities of natural gas in a populated area may be considered abnor-
mally dangerous.1 6 This factor of the "unusual" nature of the activity
is therefore similar to the appropriateness factor, with locality being
important to each. Clearly, again, a community judgment is being
made as to the frequency with which an activity can be expected to be
encountered.
So many dangers are commonplace in modern society that some
courts have shown themselves reluctant to apply such a term as "ab-
normally dangerous" to any but the very most hazardous activities. A
court may refuse to characterize welding with an oxygen-acetylene
torch as "inherently dangerous" despite the court's recognition that
the welding involves many of the same dangers as blasting, to which
strict liability has been applied. 7 However, persistent efforts to ex-
"' Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. App. 1975).
"' See, Ven J. Oja & Assoc. v. Washington Park Towers, Inc., 15 Wash. App. 356, 549
P.2d 63 (1976), aff'd on appeal, 89 Wash. 2d 72, 569 P.2d 1141 (1977). Accord that pile driving
is subject to strict liability, Lowry Hill Properties, Inc. v. Ashbach Constr. Co., 291 Minn. 429,
194 N.W.2d 767 (1971); Cincinnati Terminal Warehouses, Inc. v. Contractor, Inc., 324 N.E.2d
581 (Ohio App. 1975).
", See Bosley v. Central Vermont Pub. Serv. Corp., 127 Vt. 581, 255 A.2d 671 (1969)
(reasonable person standard applies to transmission of electricity, with res ipsa sometimes ap-
plied against electric companies).
25 See Triple-State Nat. Gas & Oil Co. v. Wellman, 114 Ky. 79, 70 S.W. 49 (1902) (gas in
meter); St. Mary's Gas Co. v. Brodbeck, 114 Ohio St. 423, 151 N.E. 323 (1926). Cf. Grace &
Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 168 F. Supp. 344 (S.D. Cal. 1958), aff'd, 278 F.2d 771 (9th Cir.
1960) (water pipe); Midwest Oil Co. v. City of Aberdeen, 69 S.D. 343, 10 N.W.2d 701 (1943)
(water main).
26 McLane v. Northwest Nat. Gas Co., 255 Or. 324, 467 P.2d 638 (1970).
27 Valley Elec., Inc. v. Doughty, 528 P.2d 927 (Colo. App. 1974) (not officially published).
See generally Annot., Liability for Injury or Damage Resulting from Fire Started by Use of
[Vol. 34:76
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pand strict liability have been made by plaintiffs' bar and seem certain
to continue. The "abnormally dangerous" doctrine allows recovery,
despite the reasonableness of the injury-producing activity, merely
because "something went wrong" in the performance of the activity,
and this doctrine is thus even more liberal toward plaintiffs than the
"unreasonably dangerous" concept in strict products liability. 28 Even
the passage of time does not necessarily lessen the tendency to
characterize a past activity as extraordinarily dangerous. 9 But this still
does not mean that the characterization can occur in a vacuum-the
locale, and the ability or inability to eliminate serious risk at that time
and place, must be weighed.
It is true, as recognized in the Restatement (Second) list of fac-
tors, that the value of an activity to society will inevitably enter the
picture; that there may be justified reluctance to impose strict liability
on certain essential services, such as those offered by utilities; and that
courts may arguably be in a better position than jurors to decide what
activities are so essential as to enjoy this freedom from strict liability.
30
Two qualifications on the importance of this "essential nature" factor
should be noted. First, in some cases this factor has arisen not in con-
nection with a determination of whether an activity is "abnormally
dangerous" but with the issue of "privilege"-a long-recognized
defense to strict liability enjoyed by those who offer services specifi-
cally authorized by law." The scope of this defense is quite narrow,
however, and in any case, it logically arises only after an activity has
been found "abnormally dangerous" and thus a potential area of
strict liability. Second, on the basic question of "abnormal danger"
itself, the size, nature, importance, and resources of the defendant are
generally of very limited relevance; it is the risk created by defendant's
Blowtorch, 49 A.L.R.2d 368 (1956) (user of blowtorch may be liable for negligence but is not
strictly liable).
25 See McClellan, Strict Liability for Drug Induced Injuries; An Excursion Through the
Maze of Products Liability, Negligence and Absolute Liability, 25 VAYNE L. REv. 1, 20-21
(1978), noting that absolute liability for abnormally dangerous activities shares with strict pro-
ducts liability a lack of concern for whether the actor's conduct was reasonable in light of
foreseeable risks and benefits.
29 See Cavan v. General Motors Corp., 280 Or. 455, 571 P.2d 1249 (1977), applying
statute of "ultimate repose" and noting that strict products liability requires only a showing that
product was unreasonably dangerous, not that it created an ultrahazardous condition.
SO RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 520(0 and Comments k & 1. See Ferguson v. Northern
States Power Co., 307 Minn. 26, 239 N.W.2d 190 (1976) (strict liability could appropriately be
imposed for uninsulated high-voltage electric line but would not be imposed because of severe
economic consequences that such a rule would cause small electric utilities in the state). Cf. Dye
v. Burdick, 262 Ark. 124, 553 S.W.2d 833 (1977) (no strict liability for dam that burst; strict
liability might hinder utilization and development of state's natural resources).
1, See W. PROSSER, TORTS 524-25 (4th ed. 1971). Cf. Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797
(1972) (no strict liability possible against United States under Federal Tort Claims Act).
1981]
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conduct that gives rise to possible strict liability.32 There is also an
underlying idea that such liability arises when an "activity or thing is
'out of place' ,,13 where the victims are particularly helpless in the face
of a danger against which they cannot, and should not, be expected to
take adequate precautions, and yet which may cause them overwhelm-
ing loss. 34 An activity may be considered less "out of place" in many
instances, e.g., if it is essential to the community, but no flat rule is
possible because the exact location of the activity and its manner of
performance must also be weighed. Similarly, there may be, in
general, a greater duty on members of the community to guard against
dangers from "essential" services, but the foreseeability of the par-
ticular risk that materialized must also be considered.
Social and/or economic value of an activity cannot, standing
alone, immunize that activity from strict liability because such liability
does not rest solely on the notion that the activity is antisocial but rests
also on the rationale that the perpetrator of a highly risky endeavor is
in the best position to pass losses on to the general public, who benefit
from the activity and who should thus also have to share the costs it
inflicts on others. Thus, there is even a tendency to restrict or
eliminate the above-mentioned defense of "privilege"-there being,
after all, no logical reason under the loss-spreading rationale for an ex-
ception to strict liability merely because an activity is specifically
authorized by law. 5 In any case, the "privilege" question is, as has
been noted, an issue that is separable from that of abnormal danger,
which concerns immunity, and that is, at best, quite narrow in scope.
It can be dealt with as a question of law since it basically involves
statutory interpretation.3 6
32 See the dissent in Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 232, 241 A.2d 637, 642
(1968), discussing the history of products liability and saying, "Obviously we cannot determine
the rule of liability on the basis of the size or resources of one of the parties." See also Thorne v.
United States, 479 F.2d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 1973) (applying to United States government the rule
that employer can be liable for negligence of independent contractor where "instrinsically
dangerous" work involved; court says this rule should apply whenever activity carries with it ex-
traordinary hazards to third persons).
" See Cain v. City of St. Paul, 268 N.W.2d 908 (Minn. 1978) (strict liability inapplicable
to high-speed chases by city police). Cf. Dye v. Burdick, 262 Ark. 124, 553 S.W.2d 833, 840
(1977) (dam burst; activity not inappropriate to location where conducted; no strict liability). See
generally W. PROSSER, TORTS 507-12 (4th ed. 1971).
3' See Pecan Shoppe Inc. v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co., 573 S.W.2d 431 (Mo. App.
1978).
3, Chavez v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 413 F. Supp. 1203 (E.D. Cal. 1976) (no logical
reason for a "public duty" exception to strict liability where common carrier was transporting
explosives).
36 See Pecan Shoppe Inc. v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co., 573 S.W.2d 431 (Mo. App.
1978) (strict liability inapplicable to motor carrier engaged in lawful transportation of ex-
[Vol. 34:76
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1981
COMMENTAR Y
The determination of "danger," however, is a judgment based
on facts-facts that are mostly divorced from questions of social util-
ity. Storage of natural gas in large quantities in a populated area may
be socially useful but can still lead to strict liability, even as to a person
working on the immediate premises." Indeed, this has been held true
despite any state authorization of the activity; the key question is the
creation of a serious risk, considering the activity's locale.38 As in any
other area of the law, there will be occasional cases in which there are
no questions of fact to be resolved, that is, no factual issues on which
reasonable persons could differ. For example, it may be indisputably
clear that blasting occurred in a residential area and was thus abnorm-
ally dangerous.39 Or it may be so obvious that water mains are in com-
mon and appropriate use in cities, and that the danger of rupture is
very slight, that strict liability's requisites can be held by the court to
be unmet.40
Traditional authority has, however, gone beyond cases in which
reasonable persons could not disagree on the degree of danger and has
stated in general terms that the propriety of imposing strict liability is
always a question of law for the court. 4 ' This has resulted in rather
rigid restrictions and categories: the use of explosives can lead to strict
liability but the storage of explosives cannot. 4 Even where the new
Restatement delineation of strict liability is cited, courts sometimes rely
heavily on precedent and therefore rule that an activity such as the
discharge of a firearm cannot be classified as ultrahazardous because it
never has been so classified in the past. 3 Yet it is also true that the
courts have sometimes been forced to recognize changes in factual
matters underlying the judicially created categories-for instance, the
plosives where third party's criminal act caused explosion). The Restatement recognizes this
defense of "privilege" only where defendant is a public officer or employee, or a common car-
rier, performing a "public duty"; no opinion is expressed as to whether mere legislative
authorization or sanction can create "privilege." RESTATEMENT § 521.
" See McLane v. Northwest Nat. Gas Co., 255 Or. 324, 467 P.2d 638 (1970).
39 See id. at 328-29, 467 P.2d at 638, stressing the importance, under the Restatement, of
the locale in which an activity is performed, and disapproving a prior case that indicated locale
was immaterial.
" See Balding v. D.B. Stutsman, Inc., 246 Cal. App. 2d 559, 54 Cal. Rptr. 717 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1966) (court could find as a fact that blasting occurred in vicinity of dwellings and
could thus impose strict liability as a matter of law). Cf. Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799
(Fla. App. 1975), discussed in Comment, supra note 15 (impounding of phosphate slimes in
reservoir held a nonnatural and ultrahazardous use of land in that district of Florida).
10 See Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co. v. Port of Seattle, 80 Wash. 2d 59, 491 P.2d 1037
(1971).
'I See Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948) (certain activities so hazar-
dous and so relatively uncommon as to call for strict liability as matter of public policy).
• Liber v. Flor, 160 Colo. 7, 415 P.2d 332 (1966), stating this to be the law of Colorado.
See Orser v. George, 252 Cal. App. 2d 660, 60 Cal. Rptr. 708 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
1981]
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improvements in aviation safety so that ground damage by aircraft can
no longer be considered a grave risk."'
It has also been necessary to set factual limits on the scope of
responsibility in order to avoid unlimited and overwhelming liability:
"the foreseeable orbit of harm" delimits the extent of strict liability."5
Thus, factual questions-submissible to a jury-arise even if the use of
strict liability is itself considered a question of law. 6
It is submitted that, under the Restatement (Second), the funda-
mental question of whether an activity is "abnormally dangerous" has
become a matter of opinion based on the particular surrounding fac-
tual circumstances, 7 and thus should be regarded as a question of
fact. When an activity is classified as a "nuisance"-even when the
nuisance is based on strict liability-this treatment of the matter as a
factual one has sometimes been the result anyway.48 Like nuisances,
"abnormally dangerous activities" cannot be reduced to exact defini-
tions. 49 They are identified as ultrahazardous when they are uncom-
mon and involve inevitably high risks of harm." Both these elements-
the frequency or "normality" of an activity, and the impossibility of
eliminating risks therefrom-are factual matters that vary with chang-
ing times and circumstances. So is the factor-supposedly emphasized
by the new Restatement delineation of strict liability-of the nature of
the location in which an activity is conducted. Very often an activity,
" See Wood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 32 Misc. 2d 955, 223 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Sup. Ct.
1961) (flying no longer ultrahazardous). But cf. RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 520A (strict
liability for ground damage by aircraft).
" See Mazza v. Berlanti Constr. Co., 206 Pa. Super. 505, 508, 214 A.2d 257, 259 (1965)
(blasting case).
6 Sometimes, of course, strict liability may be ruled inapplicable as a matter of law, but
a jury question of negligence will be found to exist. See Anderson v. Green Bay Hockey, Inc., 56
Wis. 2d 763, 203 N.W.2d 79 (1973) (no violation of safe place statute, and question of possible
ultrahazardous activity was not appealed; complaint did state a possible cause of action for
negligence).
" See Nicolai v. Day, 264 Or. 354, 506 P.2d 483 (1973) (failure of uphill landowners to
remove dirt fill did not constitute abnormally dangerous activity), relying on Loe v. Lenhardt,
227 Or. 242, 362 P.2d 312 (1961). Both cases emphasize the importance of the factual setting to
a determination of whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, but both conclude the deter-
mination of whether the activity is that dangerous is for the court.
" See Mowrer v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 518 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1975) (waterflood
operations of oil company damaged adjacent land; liability predicated on nuisance found by
jury; affirmed-nuisance and strict liability said to be amalgamated).
, See Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 88 Wash. 2d 855, 567 P.2d 218 (1977) (crop dusting
held to be matter of strict liability; all the Restatement factors must weigh equally in favor of
characterizing an activity as abnormally dangerous; any one factor is not necessarily sufficient
by itself).
11 See Flanagan v. Ethyl Corp., 390 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1968) (ultrahazardous activity must
be one that involves risk of serious harm, despite exercise of utmost care, and that is not a mat-
ter of common usage).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1981
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even if it poses grave risks, cannot be said to be always ultra-
hazardous, and thus it should not be ruled as a matter of law that it is
such. 5 Whether an activity is abnormally dangerous depends on the
surrounding circumstances.5 2 The "unusual" or "nonnatural" charac-
terization of the matter depends on community attitudes and thus
should be made by a cross-section of the community-the jury. 3
Something is not inherently abnormal but becomes such only when a
community norm is established and applied.
Of the factors mentioned in the Restatement (Second) and weighed
in the court decisions on the question of what is "abnormally
dangerous," only one factor-the social, economic and other value of
the activity-could be considered to involve basically nonfactual,
policy questions. Any such value of an activity must be viewed in light
of the general rationale behind strict liability: that we hold liable the
perpetrators of dangerous enterprises so that they may spread the costs
among all who benefit therefrom, rather than let the disproportion-
ately large loss be visited on the innocent victims. While this weighing
may involve difficult questions of the policies behind the relevant laws,
it is arguable that even this can and should be decided by a group of
community members applying community standards. "[I]t seems just
the kind of question to which a jury can provide the best answer: Was
the [defendant] entitled to impose the risk of loss upon another
without himself running the risk of paying any damages?" 5
Since, at the very least, most of the factors to be weighed on the
question of strict liability-if the Restatement definition is to be
followed"5-involve factual matters, there is no reason to depart from
the usual tort rule: If reasonable persons could not differ on the con-
clusion, it can be reached, as a matter of law, by the judge acting
alone. Otherwise, the determination of what is "abnormally danger-
ous" must be for the jury.
" See Schexnayder v. Bunge Corp., 508 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1975) (storage of grain can-
not be ruled ultrahazardous as a matter of law, at least where it occurs in a commercial
neighborhood). "One cannot expect rural tranquility on the banks of the Mississippi River." Id.
at 1076 n.9.
52 See Stallybrass, Dangerous Things and the Non-Natural User of Land, 3 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 376, 389 (1929) (distinction is not between the dangerous and non-dangerous character of
thing inherently, but between those circumstances in which defendant will be allowed to deny the
dangerous nature of his act and those in which he will not).
" See Comment, supra note 15.
, Stallybrass, Dangerous Things and the Non-Natural User of Land, 3 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
376, 389 (1929).
" It may be that the Restatement definition of "abnormally dangerous" will eventually
prove unworkable and that a definition will be adopted that lends itself more appropriately to
application by the court. This article has taken the Restatement definition as "given." Certainly
the definition's emphasis on the locale of the activity is in accord with the trend of judicial deci-
sions over recent decades. See W. PROSSER, ToRTs 511-12 (4th ed. 1971).
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